We investigate the connection between the optimal collective eavesdropping attack and the optimal cloning attack where the eavesdropper employs an optimal cloner to attack the quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. The analysis is done in the context of the security proof in Refs. [1, 2] for discrete variable protocols in d-dimensional Hilbert spaces. We consider a scenario in which the protocols and cloners are equipped with symmetries. These symmetries are used to define a quantum cloning scenario. We find that, in general, it does not hold that the optimal attack is an optimal cloner. However, there are classes of protocols, where we can identify an optimal attack by an optimal cloner. We analyze protocols with 2, d and d + 1 mutually unbiased bases where d is a prime, and show that for the protocols with 2 and d + 1 MUBs the optimal attack is an optimal cloner, but for the protocols with d MUBs, it is not 1 . Finally, we give criteria to identify protocols which have different signal states, but the same optimal attack. Using these criteria, we present qubit protocols which have the same optimal attack as the BB84 protocol or the 6-state protocol.
The objective of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to establish a secret key between two legitimate parties (Alice and Bob), that is unknown to an eavesdropper (Eve). The secret key can be used later in cryptographic applications, for example to facilitate secure communication.
To start a QKD protocol Alice prepares quantum states (signal states) and sends them through a quantum channel to Bob, who performs measurements on them. These type of protocols are referred to as prepare-andmeasure protocols and result in quantum mechanically correlated classical data being shared between Alice and Bob. They can extract a secret key from this data using classical communication protocols. For this to succeed, Alice and Bob need to be able to upper bound the amount of information Eve can gain on the correlated data. This information comes from an interaction of Eve with the signals. For any such attack, there is a trade-off between the amount of information that leaks to Eve and the amount of disturbance that she causes to the signal states. From the observation of this disturbance, Alice and Bob can estimate Eve's information on the data and perform suitable communication protocols to distill secret keys form their data on which Eve has no information.
In this paper, we deal with the problem of finding the optimal interaction between Eve and the signals. Our approach to the security analysis is to restrict Eve to collective attacks [1, 2] in which she interacts with each signal separately as the range of the validity of this attack can be shown to extend to the most general attack (see * aferenczi@iqc.ca 1 These results were already presented in the Poster session at QIP 2010, Zurich, Switzerland section III). A collective attack is completely determined by a unitary interaction U E between the signal states and some additional ancilla states held by Eve. The optimal attack which gives the highest amount of information to Eve (by some suitable measure) for a given amount of disturbance is denoted by U opt E . One specific type of interaction is an optimal quantum cloner [3] . An optimal cloner is a unitary transformation U opt C that acts on the signal states and some ancilla states, with the objective of producing two copies of the signal states. The optimal cloner has the property that the copies emerge with the highest fidelity (with respect to the original signal states) allowed by quantum mechanics. An optimal cloner is called symmetric if the fidelities of the two copies are the same, and asymmetric if the fidelities are different. Consider now the following eavesdropping attack: Eve uses an optimal asymmetric cloner to copy the signal states sent by Alice, forwards one copy to Bob, and keeps the other copy for herself. She choses the optimal cloner in such a way that the fidelity of Bob's copy is in agreement with Bob's measurement outcomes. In [4] [5] [6] , such cloning attacks were used to model Eve's attack, but optimality was only conjectured. Indeed, for some protocols (e.g. the BB84 [7] or the 6-state protocol [8] ), the optimal attack is known to be an optimal cloner, but in general the relationship between optimal cloning and optimal eavesdropping is unknown.
The goal of the present work is to establish the connection between optimal eavesdropping on QKD protocols and optimal cloning in the context of the security definition in Refs. [1, 2] for protocols with direct, one-way reconciliation. We consider protocols with symmetries so that, without loss of generality, the optimal attack is found in a set with a corresponding symmetry. In this scenario, it turns out that a necessary condition for an optimal cloner to be a candidate for an optimal attack is the strong covariance condition [9] . This condition en-sures that the optimal cloner and the optimal attack are drawn from the same set, and that the optimal cloner uses the same number of ancilla states as the optimal eavesdropping attack. If strong covariance does not hold for the optimal cloner defined by the signal states of the QKD protocol, we can already conclude that the optimal attack on the QKD protocol is not an optimal cloner.
In this paper, we calculate the optimal attack for qubitbased protocols (e.g. the BB84 and the 6-state protocol) and for protocols in d-dimensional Hilbert spaces using mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) (e.g. protocols with 2 MUBs, d+1 MUBs [4] or d MUBs) and compare the results to the optimal cloner. The security of these protocols has been studied previously in Refs. [4, 6, 8, [10] [11] [12] . In Ref. [13] , in particular, the security was proven for protocols with 2 and d + 1 MUBs using the security proof methods of Refs. [1, 2] .
Additionally, we observe that some groups of QKD protocols that share some common symmetry features can be proven to have the same optimal attack, despite having different sets of signal states. As an example, we present qubit protocols which have the same optimal attack as the BB84 protocol or the 6-state protocol, and we give criteria to identify protocols with the same optimal attack. This paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe prepare-and-measure protocols using a thought set-up that includes entangled states and is referred to as the source-replacement scheme. In section III we summarize the security proofs given in Refs. [1, 2] . In section IV, we provide two theorems about the convexity and concavity properties, as well as a lemma about the invariance property of the classical mutual information and the Holevo quantity. In section V we describe protocols with a symmetry in the signal states. Under the assumption that Alice and Bob use only averaged measurement quantities, and that the classical post processing respects certain symmetry properties, we show that the symmetries of the signal states can be transfered to Eve's interaction. This holds true in particular for the class of protocols where the signal states are composed of complete sets of basis states, and where Alice and Bob discard data where they disagree on the basis after the measurement. The formalism of quantum cloners is summarized in section VI along the lines of Ref. [9] . The main statement of section VII is that the optimal cloner must be strong covariant in order to be an optimal attack. However, strong covariance alone does not yet uniquely determine if the optimal attack is an optimal cloner. We summarize the features of the class of protocol where the signal states are invariant under the generalized Pauli group, for which the corresponding cloning attack is known to be strong covariant. In section VIII we give examples of protocols which use the mutually unbiased eigenbases of the generalized Pauli operators and analyze the relation between the optimal attack and the optimal cloner. In section IX we provide a theorem for the class of protocols with complete sets of basis states and basis sifting, which allows us to determine when the optimal attacks of different protocols in this class are the same. Finally, we draw conclusions in section X.
II. SOURCE-REPLACEMENT SCHEME
A typical QKD protocol consists of a quantum and a classical phase. In the quantum phase, Alice chooses signal states |ϕ x from a set S with probability p(x) defined on a d-dimensional Hilbert space. She sends the signal states through a quantum channel to Bob, who performs measurements on them by means of a positive operator valued measures (POVM) M B = {B y }, resulting in a joint probability distribution p(x, y). This signal preparation scheme is typically called prepare-andmeasure scheme. In the classical phase, Alice and Bob perform error correction and privacy amplification, in order extract a secret key from their measurement data.
The security proof of a protocol is more conveniently described in the source-replacement scheme, which is equivalent to the prepare-and-measure scheme. The source-replacement scheme is a thought set-up, in which Alice creates the bipartite entangled state (source state)
in her lab, keeps the first half for herself and sends the other half to Bob. The states |x form an orthonormal basis X = {|x , x = 0, ..., |S| − 1} of an |S|-dimensional Hilbert space H X . In order to prepare the state |ϕ x at Bob's side, Alice performs a projective measurement in the basis X , which triggers the source state to collapse onto the conditional state |ϕ x with probability p(x). If the signal states are linearly dependent, we can rewrite the source state in a more compact form using the Schmidt decomposition of pure states. For this purpose, we define a d-dimensional subsystem H A of H X , and express the source state on the "compressed" space
In this expression the Schmidt basis B = {|i S ; i = 0, ..., d − 1} of system S and the Schmidt coefficients √ κ i are defined as the eigenbasis and the square roots of the eigenvalues of the reduced operator φ S = tr X {|Φ XS Φ|}. The Schmidt basis A = {|ī A ; i = 0, ..., d − 1} of system A can be explicitly given by the orthonormal vectors |ī = x p(x)α
= i|ϕ x are the coefficients of the signal states in the Schmidt basis B. In the following, we omit the bar in |ī for simplicity.
Furthermore, Alice's von Neumann measurement in the basis X on the larger space H X is the Naimark extension of a measurement M A = {A x } with respect to rank-one POVM elements A x on the smaller space H A given by
Here we define the density matrix of Alice's reduced state as
and the states
where the symbol * denotes the complex conjugate with respect to the Schmidt basis A. The operators A x are positive, sum up to the identity, and satisfy the property
After Eve's interaction with the signal states, but prior to Alice and Bob's measurements, the state held by Alice and Bob is described by an unknown (mixed) state ρ AB instead of a perfect copy of the source state. Nevertheless, Alice and Bob have some information about ρ AB due to their measurements. They can constrain the form of ρ AB from the probability distribution of their measurement outcomes
in a process called parameter estimation. In addition, Alice and Bob know that Alice's reduced density matrix of ρ AB remains unchanged, as already anticipated in equation (4) , because the system A never leaves Alice's lab (see Fig. 1 ). However, unless Alice and Bob's measurements are sufficient to obtain a tomographically complete parametrization of ρ AB , there could be many states ρ AB that are compatible with p(x, y) and ρ A . For what follows, it is useful to make the following definition
Definition 1
The set Γ contains all bipartite states ρ AB that are compatible with the measurement outcomes p(x, y) and that have a given reduced state ρ A .
In the source-replacement scheme Eve attaches ancillas (defined on the system E) to the second half of the source state |Φ AS followed by a unitary transformation U E which takes the composite system SE to BE. She then keeps the transformed ancillas for herself, and resends the remaining system B to Bob (see Fig. 1 ). The mixed state ρ AB is the result of Eve's interaction with the signal states. Eve's unitary transformation U E is equivalently characterized by the purification |Ψ ABE of ρ AB on the dilated space H ABE , where the dimension of the purifying system E is the same as the dimension of AB. In order to guarantee unconditional security of the protocol, we must assume that Eve can exploit everything allowed by quantum mechanics for her attack, which is realized by giving her full control over |Ψ ABE . 
III. KEY RATE
The security proof presented in Refs. [1, 2, 14] provides a bound on the rate at which Alice and Bob can extract a secret key. The proof is valid for collective attacks and for one-way classical communication. In many cases the proof can also be extended to hold for coherent attacks and two-way communication [15, 16] .
Given Alice, Bob and Eve share the purification |Ψ of the state ρ AB . After Alice and Bob measure their systems with respect to A x and B y , they share the tripartite classical-classical-quantum (ccq) state [1] 
where |x and |y are two sets of orthonormal bases, and ρ xy E = tr AB {A x ⊗B y ⊗1 E |Ψ Ψ|}/p(x, y) are Eve's quantum states conditioned on the event that Alice and Bob's outcomes were x and y.
Using error correction and privacy amplification, Alice and Bob extract a secret key from the ccq state ρ XY E . A typical choice for the error correction is one-way reconciliation, in which the data of one party is set as a reference for the key, and the other party must correct her or his noisy data to match the reference. For our purposes, we will consider protocols with direct reconciliation, that is, Alice's data serves as the reference key and Bob corrects his data accordingly. The rate, established in [1, 2, 14] , at which an unconditionally secure key against collective attacks can be extracted is given by
where
is the classical mutual information of Alice and Bob's data, and χ(X : E) = H(X) + S(E) − S(X, E) is the Holevo quantity or quantum mutual information between Alice and Eve. H and S denote the Shannon entropy and the von Neumann entropy, respectively. The Holevo quantity is explicitly given by
where ρ x E is Eve's state conditioned on Alice's value x and ρ E = x p(x)ρ x E is Eve's reduced state. For the practical calculation of the Holevo quantity, an explicit reference to the system E can be eliminated, because the entropies S(ρ E ) and S(ρ x E ) can be expressed in terms of quantities on the systems AB: If the state |Ψ is pure, then S(ρ AB ) = S(ρ E ). If, furthermore, Alice uses rank-one POVM elements, then the conditional states ρ x BE = tr A {A x ⊗ 1 BE |Ψ Ψ|}/p(x) are pure, and there-
. In this situation, the Holevo quantity simplifies to
Usually, the key is not directly extracted from the state ρ XY E , because the data p(x, y) might be only weakly correlated. Alice and Bob typically postselect on highly correlated data before proceeding with the protocol. For example, Alice and Bob might ignore events which they measured in different bases -so called basis sifting -or they might discard data, where Bob did not record a detection event. Effectively, the key is extracted from a postselected state E(ρ AB ), which has again two classical registers XY on Alice and Bob's side and a quantum register E on Eve's side, but also additional classical registers carrying the information about the communication (announcements) between Alice and Bob that arise during the postselection.
Here we give a short description of the postselection that leads to E(ρ AB ). For a more detailed formalism see appendix A: Alice and Bob announce some information about each signal to the public, that typically does not reveal any direct knowledge about the secret key. In the case of the sifting process, for example, they announce their basis choices. Depending on the announcement, the signal is either kept or discarded. Let us denote the announcements of the kept signals by u. On the level of the quantum state ρ AB , the measurement with respect to M A and M B followed by the announcement and the discarding is equivalently described by first a filtering operation on ρ AB followed by new measurements. The filtering yields transformed states ρ u AB depending on the announcement u. The state held by Alice and Bob before the new measurement is then a convex combination of states ρ u AB over the classical subsets u with probability
The new measurement is then performed on each ρ u AB independently. In order to preserve the probability distributions of the measurement outcomes, we identify new pairs of POVMs M 
If we choose to extract the key from each ρ u XY E independently, the effective key rate is given bȳ
where r is the key rate given in equation (8) . Other choices of key extraction may combine different outcomes into one stream, but here we choose to analyze the simpler case of separate processing. By defining the total Holevo quantity and the total mutual information bȳ
where χ u (X : E) and I u (X : Y ) are the Holevo quantity and the mutual information of the state ρ u XY E , we can rewrite the effective key rate as
If Alice and Bob knew Eve's attack strategy, the calculation of the key rate would be straightforward. However, all Alice and Bob know is that they share a state ρ AB from the set Γ in Def. 1. Therefore, Eve has the freedom to chose any attack, as long as it creates a state ρ AB that is compatible with Γ. Among all these possible attacks, the one that generates the lowest key rate
is defined as the optimal attack. We call the pure state corresponding to the optimal attack |Ψ opt with the reduced state ρ opt AB . If Alice and Bob want to guarantee that their protocol is secure, they must assume that Eve performed the optimal attack. Hence, they cannot generate a secret key at a rate higher than r min for the given protocol.
IV. PROPERTIES OF THE MUTUAL INFORMATION AND THE HOLEVO QUANTITY
In this section we give three properties of the classical mutual information and the Holevo quantity.
At first, we introduce a new notation for the mutual information and the Holevo quantity, that is more convenient for our purposes throughout the rest of this paper. Let Alice and Bob share a quantum state ρ AB , which they measure with respect to the POVM M AB = {A x ⊗ B y : A x ∈ M A , B y ∈ M B }. We always assume that Eve holds the purification |Ψ of ρ AB . Instead of denoting I(X : Y ) with the dependence on the registers XY , we denote the mutual information by
By specifying the quantum state ρ AB and the POVM M AB , the measured state on the registers XY is entirely defined. On the other hand, the Holevo quantity can be directly calculated from the cq-state ρ XE that emerges after Alice's measurement of |Ψ and after tracing over Bob's system. We write
for the Holevo quantity implying that there is a step from ρ AB to |Ψ . In the first theorem of this section we show that the classical mutual information I(ρ AB , M AB ) is convex over ρ AB with fixed probability distribution p(x) = tr{A x ρ A }. We call this feature "weak convexity" to indicate that convexity only holds with the restriction on p(x).
Theorem 1 (Weak convexity). Given the states ρ AB , σ AB and the convex sumρ AB = λρ AB + (1 − λ)σ AB for λ ∈ [0, 1] with probability distributions p(x, y) = tr{A x ⊗ B y ρ AB }, q(x, y) = tr{A x ⊗ B y σ AB } and p(x, y) = λp(x, y) + (1 − λ)q(x, y). If the probability distributions satisfy p(x) = q(x) for all x, then the mutual information is convex in the sense that
The proof of this theorem is given in appendix B. Second, we show that the Holevo quantity χ(ρ AB , M A ) is concave as a function of ρ AB .
Theorem 2 (Concavity).
Given the states ρ AB , σ AB and the convex sumρ AB = λρ AB + (1 − λ)σ AB for λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the Holevo is concave, meaning that it satisfies the property
The proof of this theorem is in appendix C. Since we use postselection in our protocols, we need to extend these theorems to hold for the key rater(E(ρ AB )) in the following sensē
This property (22) does not hold in general. For example, under certain postselection strategies, the restriction p(x) = q(x) in theorem 1 may be violated. We will show later that for sifting on orthogonal basis states, the convexity property (22) holds.
Third, we show how I(ρ AB , M AB ) and χ(ρ AB , M A ) change under unitary transformations of the input state ρ AB .
Lemma 1 Given the states
The mutual information and the Holevo quantity transform as follows:
where we define the sets
and the set
The proof of this lemma is based on the cyclic property of the trace, and that the von Neumann entropy is unitarily invariant: S(U ρU † ) = S(ρ). This lemma will prove useful in the next section, where we identify U and V with the unitary representations of the symmetry groups governing A x and B y .
V. SYMMETRIES IN PROTOCOLS
In this section we introduce a scenario, in which the set Γ can be reduced to a setΓ, which contains only states with a certain symmetry corresponding to the symmetries of the signal states.
A. Symmetries of the signal states and measurements
Let G be a group with a unitary representation {U g ; g ∈ G}. A set of states S is G-invariant, if for all states |ϕ x ∈ S and all g ∈ G the state
is also in S. Here the index g(x) denotes the index of the state U g |ϕ x . The following lemma describes the symmetry properties of the POVM elements A x and the reduced state ρ A in the source replacement picture (3, 4):
Lemma 2 If the initial probability distribution p(x) is uniform (p(x) = 1/|S| for all x) and the signal states are G-invariant, then the set of POVM elements A x and the reduced state ρ A are G * -invariant, namely
The symbols * and T denote the complex conjugate and the transpose with respect to the fixed Schmidt basis B.
We prove lemma 2 in appendix D. Note that, with our particular definition of * and T with respect to the Schmidt basis, the operators U * g and U T g are well-defined. In the following, we consider only protocols in which Bob's measurement operators B y are equipped with the G-invariance
B. Parameter estimation with symmetries
The symmetries in the signal states alone do not guarantee that the optimal eavesdropping attack is symmetric. Moreover, the observations and the post processing of the measured data also need to satisfy certain symmetry criteria.
In many protocols only averaged measurement quantities are kept for the parameter estimation. For example, often only the quantum bit error rate (QBER) averaged over all the signal states is monitored. In this section, and for the rest of this paper, we consider the scenario where Alice and Bob only keep averaged measurement quantities, and where the initial probability distribution p(x) = 1/|S| of the signals is uniform. In this scenario, Alice and Bob calculate a linear function Q of the probability distribution p(x, y) with the invariance property
where the distribution
is generated by relabeling the POVM elements
. Later on, we will identify Q with the average error rate. From now on, Alice and Bob's knowledge about ρ AB is solely described by the average quantity Q instead of the more detailed distribution p(x, y). In the previous section the set of all states that are compatible with the measurement data was the set Γ in Def. 1. Now, since the average quantity Q is a coarse-grained version of p(x, y), the set of states which are compatible with Q, Γ ave , is a superset of Γ, containing all states of the form
where ρ AB ∈ Γ. The states ρ By only using averaged measurement quantities Q for parameter estimation, the set Γ is replaced by a bigger set Γave. Using the weak convexity of the key rate, the optimal attack can be chosen from a symmetrized setΓ.
Let us now define a map that takes a bipartite state ρ AB and "symmetrizes" it with respect to the group G by averaging over all the ρ (Ug) AB . In the literature this map is commonly known as twirling,
where |G| is the number of group elements in G. Due to the linearity of Q, Γ ave also contains all the statesρ AB . The twirling map T G maps the set Γ ave to a subset,Γ, which contains only states of the formρ AB . Eachρ AB has the property that it commutes with all U *
The purification of a twirled stateρ AB can be chosen to satisfies the following invariance:
The existence of this particular choice of the purification has been proven in Ref. [17] for permutation groups, but the same proof holds for arbitrary groups as well.
C. Symmetric attack
One can restrict the search for the optimal attack ρ opt AB to a search over the setΓ, provided that the key rate of the particular protocol satisfies the convexity property,
and the invariance property,
under the corresponding symmetry group G. In this situation, ρ opt AB results from a symmetric attack and must lie in the subsetΓ ⊂ Γ ave with the key rate given by
In Fig. 2 we represent schematically the transition from Γ toΓ. The symmetrized statesρ AB are easily characterized using tools from representation theory. In appendix E, we show how to obtainρ AB using Schur's lemma.
In summary, in order to evaluate the key rate over the symmetrized setΓ, the protocol needs to exhibit sufficient symmetries, both in the quantum phase and in the classical phase:
1. Symmetries in quantum phase: the set of signal states S and Bob's POVM elements B y are Ginvariant, and the a priori probability distribution p(x) is uniform.
2. Coarse-grained parameter estimation: Alice and Bob restrict themselves to averaged measurement quantities Q in the parameter estimation.
3. Convexity and invariance of the key rate: the key rater(E(ρ AB )) satisfies
In particular, the convexity and invariance properties depend strongly on the postselection procedure and must be checked for each protocol independently.
D. Examples of protocols with symmetric optimal attack: orthogonal bases as signal states
Let us now construct a class of protocols where the set of signal states contains only complete sets of basis states, and where Alice and Bob postselect on events they measured in the same basis. This postselection is commonly referred to as sifting. We will show for this class of protocols that the convexity (38) and invariance (39) of the key rate always holds. Therefore, by choosing to keep only the average error rate Q (defined below) for the parameter estimation, the optimal attack can always be assumed to be symmetric.
First, we define the signal states and the measurements. Let us denote a basis of a d-dimensional Hilbert space by B β = {|ϕ (β,k) : k = 0, ..., d − 1}, where β is the basis index. Note that, in the following the states |ϕ (β,k) carry two independent indices (β, k) instead of only one. The set of signal states of each protocol is then identified by
where L is the set from which the bases β are drawn. For each protocol the set L is fixed and contains |L| elements. If each signal state |ϕ (β,k) is chosen with equal a priori probability p(β, k) = 1/(d · |L|), Alice's reduced state ρ A in equation (4) is proportional to the identity ρ A = 1/d.
Therefore, Alice's POVM elements in equation (3) reduce to the projectors
with |ϕ * (β,k) = i |i ϕ (β,k) |i defined in equation (5) . Furthermore, we construct Bob's POVMs to be isomorphic to Alice's:
Second, Alice and Bob postselect on those measurement outcomes, which they performed in the same basis. In this particular case, Alice and Bob's announcement u is the basis β.
We show three properties in appendix F for these protocols under post selection, which we will use to prove the convexity and the invariance of the effective key ratē r(E(ρ AB )): (i) The measurements conditioned on u are simply renormalized versions of the original POVMs:
(ii) the filtered states are independent of u and satisfy ρ u AB = ρ AB , and (iii) the probability distribution p(u) = Moreover, due to the uniform distribution of p(u), the convexity property immediately transfers to the convex sumĪ
Similarly, from theorem 2 we conclude that each term χ(ρ AB , M u A ) is concave in ρ AB , which transfers also tō
by the same argument. The convexity of the effective key rater(E(ρ AB )) now follows immediately form the definition in equation (16) . Next, we show the invariance ofr(E(ρ AB )) under the symmetry group G. Since any unitary acts like a basis transformation, the sets M u A and M u B effectively inherit the G * -and G-invariance from the individual POVM elements A (β,k) and B (β,k) . More precisely, the sets
are again POVMs corresponding to the announcement with index g(u) in the protocol.
Using the definitions (48) and (49), and applying lemma 1, each component ofr(E(ρ AB )) transforms as follows under unitaries:
Due to the uniform distribution of p(u) and the G * -and G-invariance of the POVMs, the invariance property of the convex sumsĪ(E(ρ AB )) andχ(E(ρ AB )) as well as r(E(ρ AB )) follows directly.
In summary, if the average error rate Q in definition 2 is used in the parameter estimation, the optimal attack lies in the symmetric subsetΓ for this class of protocols, and the key rate r min can be calculated according to equation (40) without loss of generality.
Definition 2
The average error rate is the probability that Alice sent the signal state |ϕ (β,k) , but Bob received an orthogonal state |ϕ (β,k ) (k = k), averaged over all k and all bases β
where Q β is the average error rate found in each basis
and |L| is the number of bases in the set L.
The average Uhlmann fidelity of Bob's states with respect to Alice's signal state is defined as
With the definition of Q above, F B and Q are related by the simple relation F B = 1 − Q.
VI. QUANTUM CLONERS
A quantum cloner is a map that creates two copies of quantum states ϕ x = |ϕ x ϕ x | drawn from a set S. Let us define three isomorphic Hilbert spaces H A , H B and H C each with dimension d. A cloner C is a completely positive and trace preserving map C : H A → H B ⊗ H C that takes a state ϕ x ∈ H A to C(ϕ x ) ∈ H B ⊗ H C . The quality of each copy k (k = B, C) is determined by the single-clone Uhlmann fidelity f k (ϕ x , C(ϕ x )) of the copy with respect to the original state ϕ x . If the states ϕ x are pure, the Uhlmann fidelity reads
Instead of f k (ϕ x , C(ϕ x )), it is often assumed that only the average fidelity
is of interest. The cloner is called optimal if copy C emerges with maximal average fidelity (F C ), while the fidelity F B of the copy B has a fixed value. The cloning transformation can also be described using the Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism with a nonmaximally entangled state. For this purpose, let C act on the second half of a source state |Φ defined in equation (1). This relates C to a positive operator σ ABC ∈ H A ⊗ H B ⊗ H C via the rule
The trace-preserving property of C translates to σ A = tr BC σ ABC = ρ A , where ρ A is the reduced state of the source state |Φ given in equation (4). From σ ABC the map C can be recovered through the reverse transformation realized by
where the A x are the POVM elements defined in equation (3) . The reverse transformation effectively corresponds to preparing the states |ϕ x in the source-replacement scheme for the cloner.
A. Covariant cloners
We now give a description of quantum cloners based on the work of Refs. [9, 18] . Let the set of quantum states S is G-invariant. If the figure of merit is the average fidelity, then for every cloning map σ ABC , the "rotated" maps
for g ∈ G yield the same average fidelity F k as σ ABC . Furthermore, due to the linearity of the trace, there exists a covariant cloning map
with the same average fidelity F k as σ ABC . As a consequence, we can always choose the cloning map to be a covariant map, without loss of generality. The covariant state in equation (61) satisfies the commutation relation
B. Strong covariant cloner
In this section we describe a subset of cloning maps with a stronger symmetry than the covariant cloners, called strong covariant cloners.
The unitary realization U C of the map C can be uniquely described by the purification ofσ ABC on the extended Hilbert space H ⊗6 . This unitary realization requires three ancillas. Some cloners, however, can be realized using only one ancilla D, with U C now acting on a smaller space H A ⊗ H B ⊗ H C ⊗ H D . In [9] , these cloners are called strong covariant cloners and are defined as follows:
Definition 3 A cloner is called strong covariant if it has a purification |Σ ABCD on H ABCD with the property
It is easy to see that the strong covariant cloners are a subset of the covariant cloners: for every strong covariant cloner |Σ , tracing over the fourth system returns a covariant stateσ ABC .
Since the set of covariant cloning mapsσ ABC is a convex set and the fidelity is a linear functional of the cloning map, the cloning problem is a convex optimization problem [9] . The optimal cloner is an extremal point of the convex set, that means, a map that cannot be written as a convex sum of other maps in the set. We want to find the extremal map with the maximal clone fidelity. In [9] , two theorems about extremal maps are given:
Theorem 3 (Chiribella et al. [9] ). Let U g be an irreducible representation of the group G, and let K = {σ ABC } denote the set of covariant cloning maps with respect to G according to equation (62). Then, every cloning mapσ ABC , which allows a strong covariant purification is an extremal point of the convex set K.
This theorem states that the strong covariant maps are a subset of the extremal maps. The converse -that the extremal maps are a subset of the strong covariant maps -is not true in general. The next theorem, however, describes a special case in which the set of extremal maps and the set of strong covariant maps coincide:
Theorem 4 (Chiribella et al. [9] ). If the set of states S to be cloned is G-invariant under the generalized Pauli group Π d , then the set of strong covariant cloning maps is equal to the set of extremal maps.
Theorem 4 allows to restrict the search of the optimal cloner to strong covariant maps based on the symmetries of the signal states alone. In section VII A we give the definition of the generalized Pauli group.
VII. CONNECTION BETWEEN OPTIMAL CLONERS AND OPTIMAL ATTACKS
We identify the optimal attack in QKD with an optimal cloner if Eve's interaction U opt E coincides with the optimal cloning transformation U opt C , or, in terms of the purifications, if |Ψ opt = |Σ opt . The optimal attack is always chosen from the set of purifications ∆ defined as follows:
Definition 4
We define by ∆ the set that contains the purifications |Ψ of the symmetrized states inΓ. All states in ∆ satisfy the symmetry condition U * g ⊗ U g ⊗ U g ⊗ U * g |Ψ = |Ψ for all g ∈ G, and they are compatible with the averaged quantity Q and fixed ρ A .
We observe that all eavesdropping attacks represented by the set ∆ correspond to representations of strong covariant cloners. We can therefore make the following conclusion:
Observation 1 The optimal cloner can only be the optimal attack, if it is strong covariant. Otherwise, one can already conclude that |Ψ opt = |Σ opt .
At this point, the strong covariance property alone does not uniquely determine if the optimal attack is an optimal cloner. Even if the optimal cloner is strong covariant, we can only conclude that the optimal attack is an optimal cloner if the set ∆ contains exactly one state. Otherwise, in order to compare the optimal attack with the optimal cloner, we must perform the optimization.
A. Pauli-invariant signal states
As mentioned in theorem 4, a sufficient requirement for a cloning map to allow a strong covariant realization is the Pauli-invariance of the set of states to be cloned. Hence, if the signal states of a QKD protocol are Pauliinvariant, the corresponding cloning attack on that protocol is certainly realized by a strong covariant cloner. Therefore, we will focus our attention on protocols with signal states that are Pauli-invariant.
First, let us define the generalized Pauli group 
which generate the entire group by the following relation:
A state ρ AB that commutes with all U * r,s ⊗ U r,s is Belldiagonal
with eigenvalues u r,s ≥ 0 that satisfy r,s u r,s = 1. The eigenvectors
are called Bell states and form a maximally entangled basis of H ⊗2 . As shown in Refs. [4, 9] , the general form of the purification of ρ AB is given by |Ψ = r,s √ u r,s |U r,s |U r,d−s . Since U r,s is an irreducible representation, we can use Schur's lemma in appendix E to characterize the reduced state ρ A = 1 d , which is proportional to the identity.
VIII. EXAMPLES WITH MUTUALLY UNBIASED BASES
Mutually unbiased bases (MUBs), which were first introduced in Refs. [19, 20] , are a common choice for the signal states of QKD protocols. For example, in the qubit space, the BB84 and the 6-state protocol use 2 and 3 MUBs, respectively. In higher-dimensional Hilbert spaces, MUB protocols have been studied in Refs. [4-6, 12, 21, 22] .
MUBs are orthonormal bases B α = {|ψ [24] . The eigenbasis of the operator Z is denoted by the standard basis with the index Z,
and the eigenbases of the operators XZ β with indices β = 0, ..., d − 1 by
, and where |j are the basis vectors of the standard basis B Z .
Let us now consider protocols where the set of signal states S L contains any subset of these d + 1 eigenbases. In a slight generalization of the result of theorem 2.2 in [24] , we can show that the action fo any Pauli operator U r,s on the eigenstates of the Pauli eigenbasis B α for α ∈ {Z, 0, 1, ..., d − 1} permutes the eigenstates without changing the basis index α. Using this invariance, the set of signal states S L of any such protocol are also Pauliinvariant.
Unfortunately, the full symmetry groups of the sets S L are not known explicitly. Thus, one cannot simply write down the general form of the symmetrized statesρ AB ∈ Γ. However, in a first step, we can exploit the invariance of the set S L with respect to the generalized Pauli group. This partial symmetry implies that the optimal attack ρ opt AB must lie in the subset Γ Bell containing only Belldiagonal states defined in equation (67).
Let us, therefore, calculate the key rate (16) for MUB protocols with Bell-diagonal states ρ AB . For this purpose, we require the eigenvalue spectrum of each conditional state on Bob's side ρ (α,k) B for α ∈ {Z, 0, 1, ..., d−1}, given that Alice obtained the measurement outcome corresponding to the state |ψ α k . We project Alice's system of the Bell state onto |ψ * α k and divide the result by a normalization constant N :
In the following, all operations are modulo d, and in particular, the indices are to be understood modulo d. The overlaps in (73) are found to be
for Z and for β ∈ {0, ..., d−1}. After reinserting the overlaps into (73) and using by N = 
The set of eigenvalues
is independent of the index k with the specific values
The average error rate, the mutual information and the Holevo quantity (52, 46, 47) can now be calculated using the eigenvalue spectrum
with the Shannon entropy H(Λ α ) = − y λ α y log(λ α y ) and the von Neumann entropy S(ρ) = − tr ρ log ρ. The key rate (16) follows straightforwardly,
For the special protocols with 2, d and d + 1 MUBs, we further confine our search for the optimal attack to smaller subsetsΓ ⊂ Γ Bell . The procedure is essentially the same as the one we used in section V to reduce to the subsetΓ from the set Γ ave . For each state ρ AB in Γ Bell , we generate an equivalence class of states {ρ (Pi) AB ; i = 1, ..., n} by applying permutations P i to the eigenvalues of ρ AB . In contrast to the states ρ AB are not generated using the symmetry group of the signal states. However, since the key rate (82) is proportional to S(ρ AB ), all permuted states satisfy the invariance propertyr(E(ρ AB )) =r(E(ρ AB are again in Γ Bell . Consequently, since the convexity property (38) of the key rate holds for protocols with MUBs, we can conclude that the optimal attack is found in the subsetΓ ⊂ Γ Bell containing only convex combinations,ρ
Note that it suffices to check that the states ρ (Pi)
AB have the same average error rate Q as ρ AB in order to be in the set Γ Bell . We do not need to monitor the condition on ρ A , because ρ A = 1/d is automatically satisfied for any Bell-diagonal state.
A. 2 MUBs
We describe here how to obtain the statesρ AB ∈Γ for the example of the 2 MUBs protocol with the signal states S L = {B 0 , B Z }: given a Bell-diagnoal states ρ AB . As mentioned above, we generate the (Bell-diagonal) permuted states ρ AB by keeping the error rate (79) of ρ AB invariant
The invariance of Q is guaranteed if the permutations P i leave the sets U a = {u 0,0 }, U b = {u 0,r , u r,0 ; r = 1, ..., d − 1} and U c = {u r,s ; r, s = 1, ..., d − 1} invariant. Such permutations P i are, for example, independent permutations of the eigenvalues in each set. Therefore, in the convex combinationρ AB , the average over all eigenvalues in each set will appear. In this particular case, ρ AB has three different types of independent eigenvalues a, b and c corresponding to the three sets U a , U b and U c ,ρ
(|U r,0 U r,0 | + |U 0,r |U 0,r ) .
Now we can use the average error rate condition
2 c and the normalization condition a + 2(d − 1)b + d 2 c = 1, to further reduce the number of independent eigenvalues to only one. Through an (analytical) optimization of the key rate over the free eigenvalue, we find the following values for a, b and c that describe the optimal attack
. (85) These are exactly the same that also describe the optimal phase-covariant cloner in d dimensions [4] . The connection between optimal cloning and the optimal attack for 2 MUBs was already conjectured in [4] . The key rates for these protocols, which were independently obtained in Ref. [13] , are given by
They are plotted for d = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13 in Fig. 3 . Note that this plot is not intended to compare the performances of the different protocols. For a fair comparison, one must specify the channel model for which the key rates are drawn.
B. d + 1 MUBs
Consider protocols with the signal states S L = {B Z , B 0 , B 1 , ...B d−1 }. In contrast to the case with 2 MUBs, these protocols are tomographically complete. With the same strategy as for 2 MUBs, we construct the setΓ for this situation: The error rate (79) of a Belldiagonal state in this scenario is given by
where we used the relation that for r = 0, the sum 
As there is only one state inΓ for this protocol, the optimization of the key rate becomes trivial, and we can conclude that the optimal cloner and the optimal attack are equal. This connection was already conjectured in [4] . The cloner in this case is the optimal universal cloner in d dimensions [25, 26] . For d = 2, we recover the the 6-state protocol, where the optimal cloner is the universal cloner [3, 27] , which clones all the states on the Bloch sphere equally well. The key rates of these protocols are given by
as independently shown in Ref. [13] . We plot the key rates for d = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13 in Fig. 3 . Again, the plot is not intended to compare the performance of the protocols.
C. d MUBs
The signal states of protocols using d MUBs are S L = {B 0 , B 1 , ...B d−1 }. Unlike the protocols with d MUBs, the protocols analyzed here are not tomographically complete. The error rate 
We perform an optimization of the key rate over the free eigenvalue c, and plot the numerically obtained key rates r min in Fig. 3 for different dimensions. We compare the optimal attack to the optimal multiple phase-covariant (MPC) cloner U MPC given in Ref. [28] . This cloner copies all states of the form |ψ =
j=0 e iφj |j for φ j ∈ [0, 2π) optimally. If it is known that the eavesdropper performed an attack based on the optimal MPC cloner, Alice and Bob can expect some key rate r MPC . Numerical optimizations for d = 3, 5, 7, 11 and 13 show that r MPC is always bigger (or equal) than the key rate r min . Therefore, the optimal MPC cloner is not the optimal attack: U MPC = U opt E . In Fig. 4 we plot the difference between the key rates r MPC − r min , and the difference between the fidelities
is Eve's fidelity when using the optimal attack.
We would like to remark that the U MPC produces optimal copies of more than just the necessary d MUBs. It is possible that there exists a cloner U d that provides copies of the d MUBs with a higher fidelity F , which proves that the optimal attack is not equivalent to the optimal cloner U d either.
In table I we summarize the results obtained for the MUB protocols. It turns out that in general the intuition that the optimal attack is always an optimal cloner proves wrong, as can be seen for the protocols with d MUBs.
IX. CLASSES OF PROTOCOLS WITH THE SAME OPTIMAL ATTACK
We observe that for certain protocols with different signal states, the same attack ρ opt AB is found to be optimal. Given two protocols P and P with sets of signal states S and S that are G-and G -invariant, respectively. We consider only protocols where the signal states are orthogonal bases, and where Alice and Bob postselect on events in the same basis. These protocols were already described in section V D. We denote the average error rate for each protocol by Q and Q . Let us denote Alice and Bob's POVM elements by A x and B y for the protocol P and by A x and B y for the protocol P which are given in equation (42) We also define the set of twirled states as follows
Definition 6
The sets of all twirled bipartite statesρ AB with respect to the group G is
The following theorem states the criteria under which two protocols have the same optimal attack.
Theorem 5 If the following three conditions are satisfied, the protocols P and P have the same optimal attack
(II) The average measurement quantities Q and Q provide the same constraints on allρ AB in T G and T G .
(III) There exists a third group H with a representation {W h ; h ∈ H}, such that G and G are subgroups of H, with the following properties:
Note that IIIb automatically implies the relation
Proof. We show that the optimization of the key rate in equation (40) leads to the same optimal ρ opt AB for both protocols. There are two parts to the proof. First, from (I) and (II) it follows thatΓ =Γ by definition. Therefore, the set over which the key rate is optimized is identical for the two protocols. Second, we show that the mutual informationĪ(E(ρ AB )) and the Holevo quantitȳ χ(E(ρ AB )) in equations (46, 47) are identical for both protocols for all states in the setΓ. We show this for the example of the mutual information, but the same arguments apply to the Holevo quantity as well.
As a starting point, we switch to the language where the unitaries act on the sets M 
attack is an optimal cloner we put a checkmark ( ). Where the optimal attack is not an optimal cloner we put a cross (×). The numerical optimizations cover the cases of d MUBs up to d = 13. in (25 26). This correspondence allows us to uniquely relabel W h(x,x ) by W h(u,u ) , where u and u are the basis announcements found in P and P , respectively. We can now restate (IIIa) and say that there exists unitaries W h(u,u ) for all pairs (u, u ) such that
Number of MUBs
Furthermore, for a fixed u 0 in P , there exist unitaries
, connecting all u in P to the fixed u 0 . Similarly, there exist unitaries W h(u 0 ,u ) connecting a fixed u 0 to all u in P . Using the invari-
† for all W h ∈ H and lemma 1, the total mutual information of P and P satisfies the followinḡ
A similar statement can be made for the Holevo quantity as well.
Since there exists also a unitary W h(u0,u 0 ) , we can conclude that
from which we conclude thatĪ(E(ρ AB )) =Ī(E (ρ AB )) Again, a similar statement holds for the Holevo quantity.
It follows now that the same functionr(E(ρ AB )) = r(E (ρ AB )) appears in the optimization of protocols P and P . Since these are now identical optimization problems, they must have the same solution, and therefore the same optimal attack.
We will give some examples of protocols with the same optimal attack in the next section. We analyze qubit protocols, where we can make use of the point group symmetries, which are commonly used and well studied in the field of crystallography.
A. Protocols with the same optimal attack as the 6-state protocol
The signal states of the 6-state protocol form a regular octahedron in the Bloch sphere representation. The symmetry group G that maps an octahedron onto itself is the discrete group O with a unitary irreducible representation on the qubit space. A symmetry group G that satisfy the criterium (I) in theorem 5 is for example the icosahedron group I [29, 30] .
We can now construct protocols with signal states that are invariant under O-or I-symmetry. The average error rate adopts the same form for all these protocols, namely, Q = 2b, where b is defined in equation (87). Therefore, condition (II) in theorem 5 is also satisfied, and we conclude that the setsΓ for these protocols are identical to the set given in the case of the 6-state protocol. Since there is only one state inΓ for the 6-state protocol, we can already conclude that the optimal attack of the 6-state, the cube, the icosahedron and the dodecahedron protocols are the same, which was already established to be the optimal universal cloner.
B. Protocols with the same optimal attack as the BB84 protocol
We analyze protocols with 2n (n ≥ 2) signal states |ϕ x , that are distributed equally in the equatorial plane of the Bloch sphere, represented by the Bloch vectors s (2n) x = (sin(πx/n), 0, cos(πx/n)) x = 0, ..., 2n − 1.
(97) For each state |ϕ x there exists an orthogonal state |φ x on the opposite side of the Bloch sphere, which together form a basis. For n = 2, we recover the signal states of the BB84 protocol. In Fig. 6 2n protocols for n = 2, 3 are represented on the Bloch sphere.
The symmetry group of the signal states of the 2n-protocol is called the dihedral group denoted by D 2n . In the multiplication tables of Refs. [29, 30] , we find the form of the set T D2n for n = 2, 3. It turns out that T D6 = T D4 , where T D4 contains the symmetrized states of the BB84 protocol given in equation (84) . Since all criteria of (III) are satisfied by D ∞ , the optimal attack for the 2n-protocol for n = 3 can be identified by the optimal phase-covariant cloner, which is also the optimal attack of the BB84 protocol.
C. The cuboid protocol
For some protocols with tomographically complete measurement settings the setΓ contains more than one state. This has to do with loss of information during the symmetrization process. Recall that Alice and Bob only keep the averaged quantity Q, but otherwise ignore the measurement outcomes completely. This means that introducing symmetries to a problem can come at the expense of increasing the number of states inΓ.
As an example consider a qubit protocol where the signal states lie on the corners of a rectangular cuboid. The signal states are specified by the Bloch vectors
where θ describes the angle between the (0, y, 0)-axis of the Bloch sphere and the corners of the cuboid. This protocol is composed of 4 bases. For each state |ϕ x there exists an orthogonal state |φ x on the opposite side of the Bloch sphere. The symmetry group of this protocol is the same as of the BB84 protocol (D 4 ). Although (I) in theorem 5 is satisfied, the error rate of the cuboid protocol is given by Q = 1 2 (3b + c + (b − c) cos(2θ)), which is different from the BB84 error definition. Moreover, we could not find a group H to satisfy the condition (III). We performed numerical optimizations and found that the optimal attack of the cuboid protocol is not equal to the optimal attack on the BB84 protocol. It is also not the optimal cloner.
Note that for θ = π 2 , we recover the BB84 protocol. For θ = π 4 the signal states span a cube, which we already discussed in section IX A.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyze the connection between the optimal attack on a QKD protocol and the optimal cloning attack, in which the eavesdropper uses an optimal cloner to attack the protocol. We analyze protocols that have sufficient symmetries in the signal states and the post processing of the classical data, so that the optimal attack is, without loss of generality, a symmetric attack in the framework of the security proof of Refs. [1, 2] .
We compare the optimal symmetric attack to optimal covariant cloners. It turns out that a necessary condition for the cloning transformation to be an optimal attack is the strong covariance condition, which guarantees that the optimal attack and the optimal cloner are chosen from the same set. However, this condition is not sufficient to uniquely identify the optimal attack with the optimal cloner, except in the case where only one state is found in the set from which the optimal attack and the optimal cloner are chosen. Protocols which use d + 1 MUBs fall into this category.
We analyze the optimal attack of protocols using 2, d and d + 1 MUBs in d-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Intuitively, one expects that the optimal attack can always be identified with an optimal cloner. We prove that this intuition is correct in the case of 2 and d + 1 MUBs, but for protocols using d MUBs, the connection between optimal attack and optimal cloner fails.
We show that two protocols using different signal states can be shown to give rise to the same optimal eavesdropping attack. Whether this is the case can be investigated by simple analysis of the symmetries of the signal states, and we give examples related to the 6-state and the BB84 protocol.
During the preparation of this manuscript a related preprint [13] has appeared, where the key rates of protocols using 2 and d + 1 MUBs in d dimensions were calculated. In contrast to Ref. [13] , our emphasis lies on establishing the general connection between optimal cloning and optimal eavesdropping.
In many cases Alice and Bob share data at the end of the quantum phase of their protocol, that contains unusable parts for the key generation. Typically they postselect on a set of useful data. The postselection which we describe here applies for example to basis sifting, or to the case where Alice and Bob discard data points because Bob did not receive a signal.
Let us first examine the classical version of the postselection protocol, which starts with the ccq state ρ XY E . In the postselection described here, an announcement is made for each individual signal. After the quantum phase, Alice and Bob identify the weakly correlated data that they want to filter out by calculating to each measurement outcome x and y some values f (x) = v and f (y) = w, and announcing v and w publicly. Typically, the announcements v and w do not reveal any information about the key. Based on the announcements, Alice and Bob decide of they want to keep the data or discard it. For example, they can keep only those events where v = w ≡ u. The quantum version of the postselection procedure is described by the map E, which is composed of two consecutive steps: First, the announcement and filtering, which is jointly described by a quantum operation, and second, the measurement of the remaining states.
The announcement and filtering is described by a quantum operation with Kraus operators K u ⊗ L u on H A ⊗H B . Since only events with w = v ≡ u are kept, the Kraus operators come in paris K u ⊗ L u with the same index u. The Kraus operators satisfy The probability that the state ρ AB is kept during the postselection is p kept . There is also a Kraus operator corresponding to the discarded events, which happens with probability 1 − p kept . For each Kraus operator, the information u is announced to all parties and stored in three classical registersĀ,B andĒ held by Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively. The state after the quantum operation held by Alice, Bob and Eve, conditioned on kept events is given by
is the pure state conditioned on the announcement u with normalizatioñ p(u), and p(u) =p(u)/p kept is the normalized probability distribution of the announcement u conditioned on events that were kept. The announcement and filtering step is followed by a measurement to extract the remaining data. Each |Ψ u is measured with respect to new (normalized) POVMs M u A and M u B with elements conditioned on the announcement u:
The inverses K In this appendix we prove theorem 1 in section IV. Proof. The mutual information I(ρ AB , M AB ) depends only on the probability distribution p(x, y). Forρ AB the mutual information is explicitly given by I(ρ AB , M AB ) = H(p(x)) − H(X|Y )p, where H(p(x)) = − x p(x) log p(x) is the Shannon entropy, and H(X|Y )p = x,yp (x, y) log
is the conditional entropy. The first term satisfies
because p(x) = q(x) =p(x). The second term, the conditional entropy, is concave, namely
where H(X|Y ) p = − x,y p(x, y) log p(x,y) p(y) and similarly for H(X|Y ) q . The concavity of the conditional entropy is shown by applying the log sum inequality [31] ,
to H(X|Y )p. Equations (B1) and (B2) together imply the weak convexity of the classical mutual information.
Appendix C: Proof of the concavity of the Holevo quantity
In this appendix we prove theorem 2 in section IV. We will use the traditional notation χ(X : E) ρ XE := Proof. Given the states ρ AB and σ AB with purifications |Ψ ABE and |Σ ABE on the system E = E . Alice measures the states with respect to the POVM elements A x and stores the result in the system X. The cq states describing the situation for Alice and Eve after the measurement are
with Eve's conditional states ρ x E = tr AB {A x ⊗ 1|Ψ Ψ|}/p(x) and σ x E = tr AB {A x ⊗1|Σ Σ|}/q(x). The Holevo quantity of ρ XE and σ XE is given by χ(ρ AB , M A )) = χ(X : E ) ρ XE , χ(σ AB , M A )) = χ(X : E ) σ XE .
We construct a particular purification on the joint system E = E F for the convex sumρ AB = λρ AB + (1 − λ)σ AB :
After measuring |Ψ ABE F with respect to A x , the state shared by Alice and Eve is
with Eve's conditional statesρ Let M : F → F be a trace-preserving quantum operation. For our purposes, we identify M with a measurement on F in the standard basis {|0 , |1 } and write the outcome in a new register F . By defining λ x = λ p(x) p(x) , the state after the measurement is given by
Let us state a lemma about the Holevo quantity extracted from a state of the form ρ XE F :
Lemma 3 The Holevo quantity extracted from ρ XE F satisfies χ(X : E F ) ρ XE F ≥ λχ(X : E ) ρ XE + (C8) (1 − λ)χ(X : E ) σ XE , with χ(X : E ) ρ XE and χ(X : E ) σ XE given in equation (C3). Equality holds, if the probabilities λ x are independent of x, λ x = λ.
Proof. From ρ XE F we calculate the Holevo quantity using the joint entropy theorem of the von Neuman entropy [32] χ(X : EF ) = λχ(X : E ) ρ XE + (1 − λ)χ(X :
with the binary entropy function h(x) = −x log(x) − (1 − x) log(1−x), and where χ(X : E ) ρ XE and χ(X : E ) σ XE are given in equation (C3). From the concavity of the Shannon entropy it follows that h(λ)− xp (x)h(λ x ) ≥ 0, and in particular, if λ = λ x for all x, the equality holds.
According to [32] , a map of the form M : F → F can only decrease the Holevo quantity:
Equation (C8) together with equation (C10), show that the desired result.
Appendix D: Proof of lemma 2
In this appendix we prove the G * -invariance of ρ A and A x for the source-replacement scheme in section II, if p(x) is uniformly distributed and if the signal states are G-invariant.
Proof. We trace out system S from the source state |Φ AS in equation (2) and identify Alice's reduced state ρ A by
From the G-invariance of the signal states and the uniform distribution of p(x), it follows that ρ A is also Ginvariant. Since ρ A is diagonal in the basis B with real eigenvalues κ i , it holds that
Therefore, ρ A is also G * -invariance (where the complex conjugate is taken with respect to the Schmidt basis) as can be easily seen from U * g ρ A U T g = (U g ρ A U † g ) * = ρ A . Due to the positivity of the coefficients κ i and the full rank of ρ A , the square root √ ρ A and the inverse ρ −1
A are well-defined. The G-and G * -invariance of ρ −1
A can be straightforwardly verified:
A , and similarly for the G * -invariance. In [17] , it is shown for permutation groups, that for every positive G-invariant operator ρ A , √ ρ A is also Ginvariant. The same proof applies also here, and thus, the G-and G * -invariance of ρ A also implies the G-and G * -invariance of √ ρ A .
By using the G-invariance of the signals states, and the G * -invariance of √ ρ A and ρ
−1
A , the G * -invariance of A x follows directly from the definition in equation (3) .
that |Ψ u = |Ψ , and that the new POVMs M 
